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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Charles R. Breyer, Judge

United States of America,)

Plaintiff,)

VS.) NO. CR 14-0196 CRB

Leland Yee and Keith Jackson,)

Defendants.)

San Francisco, California Monday, February 22, 2016

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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(APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE)

REPORTED BY: Kelly L. Shainline, CSR No. 13476, RPR

Court Reporter Pro Tem

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Monday - February 22, 2016 2:00 p.m. THE CLERK: Calling case CR 14-0196, The United States of America versus Leland Yee, Keith Jackson. Appearances, counsel. Please come up to the podium. MS. BADGER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Susan Badger, William Frentzen, and Wagar Hasib on behalf of the United States. MR. CHATTERJEE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Raj Chatterjee here on behalf of Keith Jackson. MR. LASSART: Good afternoon, Your Honor. James Lassart appearing on behalf of Leland Yee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. I note that the defendants aren't present, and it's my intention to discuss a scheduling matter as distinct from anything of substance. However, this is being memorialized by the court reporter so there will be a transcript of it. And this is why I want to discuss it with the government and with counsel for Mr. Yee and Mr. Keith Jackson. Over the last few days, quite a few days, I've been reading the presentence materials, the reports, the memoranda, the guidelines, you know, preparing for the sentencing hearing which is scheduled for Wednesday.

It is obvious anyone looking at it would see that there's a substantial dispute between the parties as to the guideline range. And obviously -- well, I can say two things. Number

one, under the law the Court must resolve any disputes as to the guideline range where they are certainly relevant factors with respect to sentencing.

The exercise that the Court follows, and I think it is the one that's appropriate, would be the first thing you do is set the sentencing guideline range, and then you weigh that determination along with five or so other factors which are listed in 3553(a), including the characteristics of the defendant, the history, the nature and circumstances of the events, et cetera, et cetera.

Okay. So it's one factor among other factors that the Court -- that is, the sentencing guideline range is one factor among other factors that the Court would consider in imposing a sentence. As such, I think that it's clear that the parties are entitled to have a correct -- at least what the Court considers to be a correct sentencing guideline range.

After having said that, and added to it the fact that there are substantial disputes between the parties as to what is the appropriate sentencing guideline range, I wanted to make the following suggestion, which is: That under 6A1.3, the Court has the power and is required to conduct some type of hearing where there are disputes of relevant factors that would be considered by the Court in determining the sentence. That hearing is not like most other hearings in any Court proceeding. Number one, the rules of evidence don't apply.

Number two, the standard that is to be applied by the Court is one based upon a probability of truth of the assertion, as distinct from preponderance of the evidence. It may be preponderance and probability are one and the same, I've never quite figured out the distinctions. But it's certainly not beyond a reasonable doubt and it's not clear and convincing. It's a much more relaxed standard.

So I think that's a correct statement of the law and where we are.

Now, it also occurred to me that the defendants in this case -- I'm talking about your clients -- have entered a plea of guilty. That is done for a variety of reasons, one of which is that there's not been a public parade of all of the evidence that the government believes to be incriminatory and perhaps contextual in any given situation because it's not necessary in light of the fact that a defendant has pled guilty to the offense.

If a hearing takes place of the type that I've described, then to some extent, depending on what the evidence is, that benefit, if it's a benefit, has been eliminated. That is to say, witnesses come, they're cross-examined. The rules of evidence don't apply. It becomes a very different kind of hearing than at trial, but it has the same impact in some measure of presenting evidence, or whatever one wants to call these things, facts, impressions, circumstances, that the

defense, by virtue of the pleas, have set aside or have not required any showing in light of the guilty plea.

So the question is, in the Court's mind, what does the defense want to do? Not actually soliciting the government's views. Nor am I soliciting your views today. Okay. Because I think in any event, it's something that you have to talk to your -- one, you have to think about it, and number two, you have to talk to your client, and I think that this sort of thing is the client's call.

Looking at -- let's take Senator Yee for a moment. The Probation Department has found that he's in adjusted offense level 29. They're using criminal history category one, adjusted offense level 29, that the range is 87 to 108 months.

The government has asked for 96 months.

MS. BADGER: I don't think that's right.

THE COURT: Is that correct?

MS. BADGER: Your Honor, I apologize. I did not bring up my copy of the final draft of the PSR, but there was an adjustment. I thought it was --

THE COURT: Well, I may not -- I have --

MS. BADGER: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: I have the report of February 10.

MS. BADGER: 70 to 87 months comes to mind.

THE COURT: Wait a minute, wait a minute. Thank you.

Let me look. I must have either copied it incorrectly or I

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have the wrong report.
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              MS. BADGER: There was a revised version filed on
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     February 17th.
               THE COURT: And what is it? I'm sorry. Is it
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     adjusted offense level 29?
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              MS. BADGER: Well, I'm sorry, I don't have my copy.
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      It was adjusted downward -- if anybody -- nobody has their
     quidelines.
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               THE COURT: Well, what do you think it is?
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              MS. BADGER: It came out to -- I believe it was 70 to
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     87 months.
               THE COURT: Well, 70 to 87 months would be 27.
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              MS. BADGER: That sounds right. With the acceptance
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     of responsibil --
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               THE COURT: The final adjusted offense level 87 -- I
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     mean, 27. Well, okay, wait a minute. Let me just -- let's
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     assume that's what it is for the sake of this discussion.
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     Nobody's bound by it. Nobody's bound by it. Okay?
19
           Okay. If it's 27 and one, that would be 70 to 87 months.
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     The government recommendation, though, is what?
              MS. BADGER: 96 months.
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               THE COURT: Okay. So an upward?
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              MS. BADGER: Correct.
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               THE COURT: An upward departure.
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              MS. BADGER: Correct.
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THE COURT: Okay. And I want to set aside upward departures for a moment.

The defense has said that the sentencing guideline range is 51 to 63 months, I think.

MR. LASSART: Correct.

THE COURT: And so that would be -- 51 to 63, and that would be 24.

MR. LASSART: 24.

THE COURT: Since I haven't seen this memorandum, or at least I don't have it in mind, does the government take the position -- maybe I should have done Keith Jackson first. Does the government take the position that the recommendation of 96 is an upward departure?

MS. BADGER: It is an upward adjustment, Your Honor. We agreed with the calculation of 70 to 87 months.

THE COURT: Okay. So here is my point. My point is that if the defense does not challenge the offense level 27, which presently they do, but doesn't challenge that for purposes of sentencing, I don't have to have a sentencing hearing on all of these issues relating to was it correctly calculated.

And the reason I'm saying that is because since I would consider all of those other factors, five of them in number, I think, in imposing a sentence, I, for one, don't believe that I would attribute more weight -- I mean, I can assure you that I

would not attribute more weight than the sentencing guideline range, whatever it is, to the other factors.

So what I'm saying is its role in this sentencing process, while it has a role, isn't the predominant role necessarily.

It is simply one of the parts to it. And I would also say that however the evidence worked out, whatever it was, obviously that would be considered by the Court.

So where I am today is I consider the submissions that have been filed without looking at an evidentiary hearing. Everybody has made their arguments. Your argument is there's no evidence that it was 200 weapons or more. You have other arguments, but that's a principal argument. There are other arguments that you make as well. And I have whatever the record is in front of me.

Obviously, if that record is challenged and we have an evidentiary hearing, then it's whatever comes out at the evidentiary hearing. Okay.

So let me put you aside, Mr. Lassart, for a moment and talk to Mr. Chatterjee.

Let's take your case. Your case, unless I got this one wrong as well, is that the Probation Department found that the guideline range was adjusted offense level of 33 and the guideline range was 135 to 168. Is everybody on the same page there?

MR. CHATTERJEE: That sounds correct to me,

Your Honor. I don't have the brief in front of me, but that sounds right.

THE COURT: All right. The government has made a recommendation of 100 -- well, the plea agreement, unlike Mr. Lassart's situation where he did not agree to a range in the plea agreement, you did.

MR. CHATTERJEE: Correct.

THE COURT: And the plea agreement is 72 to 120 months.

MR. CHATTERJEE: Six years to ten years, yes.

THE COURT: Pardon me?

MR. CHATTERJEE: Yes, six to ten years.

THE COURT: Yes. The government recommends 120, the defense says 72. And what you would have to agree to, if you wanted to avoid, I think, the sentencing hearing on the guideline range is agree that you would not object if a guideline range was set at 30. Because 30 encompasses your plea agreement. I mean, it's one month over, but no one cares about that. I say nobody cares about it. I can tell you a long story about somebody who did care about it, but it's not -- for these purposes, it makes no difference.

And so what I'm saying in so many words is I'd like you to figure out whether you want to proceed by way of a sentencing hearing that would be in the form of an evidentiary hearing in which your various objections to the sentencing guideline

calculation are aired, considered for the purpose of setting 1 the sentencing guideline range. 2 I, again, will say that it is my view that I can sentence 3 based upon the proposal that I have stated, that is, that a 4 party agrees not to a sentencing guideline range, but that they 5 would have no objection for purposes of sentencing that a 6 sentencing guideline range of, in Mr. Jackson's agreement, be 7 30, and I think in Senator Yee's, I have 28, one over what was 8 found by the Probation Department. 9 10 I think that's right. Have I said it right? MS. BADGER: 27, I think, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Well, quideline range the Probation 12 13 Department found was 27. Well, let's see. 14 MR. LASSART: They adjusted down also one, I think. 15 THE COURT: Well, I may have to get the government's 16 consent on that, then. 17 MS. BADGER: We -- so we agree --THE COURT: In other words, you are asking for a 18 19 departure. 20 MS. BADGER: Yes. 21 THE COURT: And so you are asking for a departure of You're asking for a departure from the high of -- from the 22 23 70 to 87, you're saying 96. MS. BADGER: Right. But we do agree with the 24 25 calculation. We think the calculation of the quideline

range --1 2 THE COURT: Is 70 to 87 months. 3 MS. BADGER: Correct. THE COURT: And what is your view as to that? 4 MR. LASSART: What, Your Honor? 5 THE COURT: Your view is either in agreement that the 6 7 range is 70 to 80 months -- no, you don't. You say it's 51 to 63. 8 MR. LASSART: It's 51 to 63. 9 THE COURT: Okay. So it is you that has to deal with 10 11 it. MR. LASSART: Assuming the government is right, that's 12 13 right. 14 MS. BADGER: Well --15 THE COURT: Well, you see, but it's not a question --16 what I'm saying to you, it's not a question of who's right or 17 who's wrong because I don't know that until I have a hearing. 18 And the question is: Do you want to have the hearing? And 19 what I'm suggesting to you is that you can have the hearing, 20 highly appropriate to have the hearing, and then I will do my best to set the sentencing guideline range and then I will do 21 22 the sentence after I take all the 3553(a) factors into account. 23 A second way to do it is to simply agree that you don't object to what is proposed as a quideline range and continue to 24

argue your particular sentence that you think is appropriate.

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I think for those purposes, obviously, if you do get into that agreement, we would have to not have argument such as, well, we're -- you know, look at the defense, they're arguing for 24 months under the -- whatever it is, X number of months under the quideline range.

I'm saying to you that there are factors in these two cases that are actually of great significance that really do control how the sentencing would work other than the fine tuning of a sentencing guideline range. In Senator Yee's case, it's because he's a -- you know, was a politician or was held to elective office. That's a different -- even though of course, public corruption and so forth and so on are encompassed within the guidelines, but that is a significant difference from the run-of-the-mill case.

So I don't know. You know, I don't know how you want to come out. I know one thing is that if you do decide that you want your evidentiary hearing, I do not believe it can be done on Wednesday. I think I'm going to have to set aside some time to have a full-blown evidentiary hearing because it's going to take a considerable period of time to go through these things, marshal the evidence, argue the evidence, and see if it ought to be subject to -- you know, and see what the parties want to do with respect to any witnesses.

MR. CHATTERJEE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Chatterjee.

MR. CHATTERJEE: May I --

THE COURT: I mean, that's what I'm thinking about.

And the reason I put it on the table is basically a scheduling -- first, a scheduling issue. And I don't think I have these problems with either Randy Jackson or Marlon Sullivan. They're in a separate category. But I do have them with the submissions that I've received.

Mr. Chatterjee.

MR. CHATTERJEE: I just want to explore a third option for consideration, and that is, at least with regard to Mr. Jackson, I think there's two principal issues that go to sentencing guidelines. One is, as Your Honor mentioned, the number of guns involved in the conspiracy. And number two, whether some of the charges that are to be dismissed is relevant conduct under the sentencing guidelines for purposes of count two, which is the campaign conspiracies. I think those are the two principal issues. And the parties set forth their positions in their papers.

And the third option I'm exploring is to submit to the Court on the record that's been submitted and let the parties argue their side and let the Court resolve the issue in lieu of having an evidentiary hearing.

THE COURT: I think it's inconclusive. I mean, I think you have objected to the -- you objected to this evidence. So, I mean, how could I -- how can I under 6A1.3,

how can I do it? I don't think I can.

MR. FRENTZEN: That's accurate, Your Honor. I mean, what happened here was that there were presentations of evidence in the form of discovery. And the Probation Office got that. The Probation Office received objections from defendant Jackson with regard to these issues which are, at their core, basically factual issues. The Probation Office disagreed with them.

When we filed our sentencing memorandum, we relied on a PSR that had made factual findings that we agreed with. So the issue was then in the sentencing memo that they filed contemporaneously with our sentencing memo, they reiterated but added to those original objections that the Probation Office had already resolved in the way that the government believed that they should properly be resolved. And then they filed a response, which candidly I was preparing a reply, which perhaps now I don't necessarily need to go through but which was largely a layout of factual matters.

But I tend to agree with the Court. If the issue is going to be joined about the extent to which the -- for example, the number of firearms was in fact prospectively 200 or more, or to the extent to which the narcotics trafficking, firearms trafficking, and murder-for-hire were integrated into the count two conduct, which -- and one of the things is there is conversation after conversation where the conversations bounce

around from narcotics trafficking to weapons trafficking from the Philippines to Senator Yee needs money to -- et cetera, et cetera, to the extent that we view them as relevant conduct, but these are, at its core, factual matters. And so if it's going to be joined, then we would tend to agree that we're happy to lay it out for the Court, it's just going to take some time.

THE COURT: Let me -- that is my view with respect to the record. But let me add another factor.

It's hard for me to see any of the things that are discussed in the presentence report and in the submission of the government, as an example, that wouldn't have some tangential relevance to the 3553(a) factors, that is to say, that I'm supposed to look at the history and characteristics of the defendant.

Now, it may be that your position is absolutely correct that in terms of relevant conduct, it doesn't come in. But because it doesn't come in as relevant conduct doesn't mean it's excluded if it's of some significance, excluded from the Court's consideration in fashioning the appropriate sentence.

MR. CHATTERJEE: We understand that.

THE COURT: So I'm trying to figure out what do you gain? I mean, I hate to -- number one, I don't want to lead you along to say that if you do X, you'll get a particular sentence, if you do Y, you'll get a particular sentence. No.

I have to tell you my mind is open on the subject of the appropriate sentence.

What I'm saying to you is that if in fact there is -- if in fact these materials to some extent come in for the Court's consideration as to the appropriate sentence, I don't know what the big -- I don't know how to say it. I wonder whether the dispute is really -- is really so crucial to the determination of the appropriate sentence.

Now, it may look to you like, well, gee, the judge wants to avoid work, or, you know, this whole thing is fraught with, you know, quote, uncertainties that on an appeal if we're unhappy with the result, we're able to challenge.

And to which I would say that may be the case, I don't know. You haven't given up your right. I haven't looked at a plea agreement. But I always take the position, much to the consternation of the government, that if I make an error at the time of sentencing, that's preserved. Putting that aside, whether it is or not, I don't know, in the plea agreement. It probably isn't, but that's another issue.

But it seems to me one thing I would say so you're not -you know, you're not deceived is once I get my calculation and
so forth, if it's a contested calculation, I would also say
whatever weight I would give to the calculation and what weight
I give to all the other factors that are considered, you know,
it's one factor among others. And if it's an accurate

statement of the law that I would consider all these things or can consider these things, then I have to wonder what is to be gained by it. That's all I -- you know, that's what my present thinking is.

Mr. Lassart?

MR. LASSART: Your Honor, what puts me in a dilemma is that I'm hearing the Court say that they're treating the sentence guideline calculations between the two parties, because that's where we are, which in essence is a dispute that's generated by the enhancement arguments. That's really what's driving the sentence guideline difference between the two parties. This is looking at this as if it were a disputed fact, much like a summary judgment type of situation.

Now, I know you don't apply *Celotex* to criminal law, but when I see a disputed fact like that, I have to be concerned of what the Court's thought is on the dispute on the analysis between the two sides with regard to the enhancement evidence.

And I understand what the Court is saying is the 6A1 analysis is -- or hearing is a way to generate in an evidentiary format an ability for the Court to decipher or choose, so to speak, where the enhancement lies to determine what the guidelines are.

Now, I don't know how the Court is going to weigh the guidelines so I'm -- that's where, if the Court were to say, well, that is just another factor, like you said in the

beginning, that would be fine. But we all are -- I'm concerned on my client's behalf. I don't know how that all fits, that's my concern. And I don't know where the government is on that. But I think that's where we are. We have two disputed analyses on a factual basis that lead to two different guideline ranges, and that's what's before the Court.

Now, I have -- I'm always loathe to throw things up in the air and see what happens because I like a little more control of that, but that's my problem. I'm just kind of giving the Court back what my thoughts are on this. I don't know where I would come down on it until I spoke to the client. I think I know, but I'm thinking of the issues like, you know: Is there a waiver in here somewhere? Who's going to get called as a witness? All of those issues are percolating in this little 6A1 hearing. And there may be a critical witness that I can't call because of their Fifth Amendment right.

Those are all the issues that this kind of an analysis generates, Your Honor. I don't know if that helped or just made it worse.

THE COURT: Well, you know, it helps explain to me why it's a difficult decision for you to make because it's a set of uncertainties. I don't have an answer for that.

I mean, I look at it and I've heard the evidence and read the evidence. Let's take the gun enhancement as an example.

The defense points out nobody said 200 weapons. The

prosecution says, well, he talked about deals that would be somewhere -- costing somewhere in the neighborhood of -- I'm going to be wrong but I'd say a half million or a quarter million -- half a million to two and a half million dollars, and here's my expert's declaration that says that's got to be at least 200 weapons.

Okay. Taking those two facts, taking those two views of it, I don't know whether that's enough to come to a conclusion based upon a preponderance of the evidence as to whether that -- the people would understand that to mean 200 or more weapons or whether they wouldn't. But what I'm saying to you is it wouldn't make much difference to me. That's what I'm saying. What I'm saying is I've heard the evidence. The evidence said 200 on the one hand, and on the other hand they were talking about large-scale arrangements. I don't know. That's -- you know, sometimes that's just what the evidence is. There it is.

Now, what do I do with that? It's hard, necessarily. And I think, one, I wait. If I have an evidentiary hearing, I wait and see exactly what is the record as to the 200 weapons. Everybody flushes it out. In comes the person with the testimony. Or in comes -- we play the recording or dot, dot, dot, dot, dot, we do all that. And then I may be no better off than I am today, or I may be better off, you know.

Okay. Or we leave it alone, and I just say, okay, that's

what it is. How does that fit into what the appropriate sentence is?

I don't know how else -- I mean, it may be that we're all sitting with different roles in this and trying to figure out how to deal with it.

MR. LASSART: Your Honor, may I suggest this?

THE COURT: I don't fault anybody for teeing it up.

But having teed it up, I have to resolve it.

MR. LASSART: Your Honor, I guess my suggestion would be, like most decisions that are hard, to delay them a little bit. It seems to me that if this opportunity is out there, I'm going to have to look at it and explain it to the client and see what the client says before I can answer these questions.

THE COURT: No, I don't think you have to answer -- I mean, it seems to me that you can -- I don't know on that. My guess is that you will want to know before probably Wednesday morning because you probably have people who -- I don't know whether you expect to call any witnesses or people to get up and speak or not. Maybe not.

MR. LASSART: I don't. I don't.

THE COURT: You don't. Well, okay. Let's say
Wednesday morning you simply say we're ready to proceed with
sentencing now, or there is a dispute, there remains a dispute
and so we need to have an evidentiary hearing to resolve the
dispute.

So I'm not trying to -- I'm sorry I didn't -- I mean, I only turned to these materials last week, but, you know, the more I read through them, and they're voluminous -- not voluminous, but they're considerable -- the more I looked at it trying to figure out how am I going to do it? How am I going to do it?

You know, I'm willing to postpone the sentencing in either or both of your cases. I'm willing to treat them differently. You don't have to agree, the two of you, as to what should be done, one or the other.

I don't know what else to do, you know. I sort of wanted to do it without a circus of everybody being here because I actually wanted you to be able to decide things based upon what I call reasoned, thoughtful decision.

MR. LASSART: A little reflection.

THE COURT: Well, you know, it's tough. You know, being a trial lawyer, you know, you make decisions all the time. You have to make them quickly. Here you don't have to make them so quickly. And believe me, I thoroughly understand the significance of sentencing. It is -- you know, it is obviously a significant deal.

So I think that's -- yeah, let me answer any questions. I just don't want to get into the substance of any arguing because your clients aren't here. That's why I toss out just the procedural aspect.

MR. LASSART: I don't want to get into the substance, Your Honor, but I am interested in the procedure and that's one of the concerns I have. Who goes first in this hearing? the lead? I understand that probably the government because they have a burden. We probably disagree that it's a preponderance as opposed to clear and convincing, but that's another issue that the Court has to deal with. THE COURT: Well, as I understand the issue, it

becomes a clear -- it's not always a preponderance of the evidence. To the extent that it is a significant increase in the quideline range, a higher standard is used. So I think that's correct.

MR. LASSART: And so the Court knows, it's not -- I mean, if there's 200 quns, there's a 10-level raise. what this -- this is a large amount of this issue. That's what this -- the reason both sides are talking about this issue. And that's where we are.

MS. BADGER: Although, I believe a less than 200 guns -- again, I apologize, I don't have my guidelines in front of me, but there's still -- if some amount of guns are contemplated, then there's --

THE COURT: Yeah, what is it?

MS. BADGER: -- another adjustment.

THE COURT: I had my guidelines.

It's 2K2.1, Your Honor. MR. FRENTZEN:

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THE COURT: What? 1 MR. FRENTZEN: It's 2K2.1. I believe the next 2 drop-down is 100 guns, if I'm not mistaken. 3 **THE COURT:** And what is the enhancement at that? 4 MR. FRENTZEN: I think it would be two less levels if 5 it was 100. 6 7 THE COURT: 25 to 90, 96. There's no dispute here, is 8 there, that it was at least 25? MR. LASSART: Well, you know, Your Honor, I think this 9 is a dispute --10 11 THE COURT: Well, I'd go with the papers, but I think 12 there's no dispute. 13 MS. BADGER: Well, there was even -- Senator Yee 14 discussed at one point there was 100 rifles available. So --15 and that's in our papers. 16 THE COURT: Well, let's say 25. We're really talking 17 about four -- four levels. So we're not really talking about What I'm saying is that what's in dispute is at most four 18 and possibly two. You have to -- these are all tradeoffs. 19 20 MR. CHATTERJEE: Well, I think we understand the 21 Court's concerns. I say when it comes to the guns, those are just talk in the Philippines. There's no agreement as to any 22 23 number of guns or weapons or types of weapons. So we -- you know, obviously we have to make a decision. 24

THE COURT: I think there was some discussion of types

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of weapons.

MR. CHATTERJEE: Well, there was discussion. There was lots of discussion. There was no agreement. There was no confirmation of what they were going to do. It was -- there was certainly discussion about it. There's no question about that. But discussion itself is -- doesn't rise to the level of the enhancement, in our view.

THE COURT: Well, if your view is accepted, which it could be as a matter of law, as you state, the fact that they're talking about AK47s, or whatever it is, and there were these discussions can be considered by the Court in imposing the sentence.

So it may not -- what I'm saying is all of this may not translate into the guideline range, but it's not that it wouldn't be considered in some form in trying to arrive at an appropriate sentence.

MR. CHATTERJEE: Well, we'll certainly discuss this with our client. And we understand the Court's questions.

THE COURT: Well, just let the government know. I think, you know, let the government know, let me know. I'd like to know, if at all possible, tomorrow at the end of the day whether you want to proceed with sentencing on Wednesday if you can't -- you'll have to be here on Wednesday in any event. But if you feel that there ought to be some resolution of the sentencing guideline range, then I will simply pick a date for

a hearing on those matters.

MR. CHATTERJEE: And at least I want to clarify for Mr. Jackson. To avoid a hearing, under your view, we'd have to not object to a range of 30?

THE COURT: Well, I looked at -- for whatever 120 is. Everybody agrees -- we'll limit it to 120 -- is 30, adjusted offense level of 30. It's now 33. The government states that they're not asking for an upward departure, they're asking actually for a variance down to -- down to 120 months or down to 30. It is your view, however, that the guideline range is lower. Okay. I don't know how else to deal with it.

MR. LASSART: Your Honor, can I ask you this?

THE COURT: You can ask me anything, Mr. Lassart.

MR. LASSART: It doesn't guarantee an answer, does it?

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't guarantee the right answer, but you'll get an answer.

MR. LASSART: If there is no hearing requested, is it the Court's thought that we have waived our objections?

THE COURT: Well, yes. I mean, I think you have to -I think that what is incorporated in there is to the extent
your objections go to a guideline factor, you will have waived
it. Absolutely. Because I have to rule on the objection.

Now, it's easy to rule on should this language be in or should this be out, so forth and so on. But where you object to something that is part of the sentencing guideline range, I

would have to rule on it. And I'm seeking your opinion --

MR. LASSART: So if we waive the hearing, then we would -- the Court would consider the fact that we waived objecting to the guideline range.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LASSART: Okay.

THE COURT: I believe that's accurate. That you have agreed not to object. You're not saying you think it's the correct guideline range, but you are for -- like a guilty plea. You're not even saying your client would necessarily be convicted at trial, but a person who enters a guilty plea admits certain facts, and I guess in my view pleads guilty because he is guilty. But maybe that's a bad analogy.

But at any rate, yes, it is -- since your -- well, not your client, but since Mr. Jackson agreed to a sentencing guideline -- a sentence -- I mean, a sentence -- he didn't agree to a guideline range, he agreed to a particular sentence range, the way I view that is I view that that range is a range of reasonable sentences.

MR. LASSART: So -- just so --

THE COURT: So I don't know -- in other words, for example, I don't know -- let's say I sentence him to the upper part of the range and he wants to appeal. I don't know how he can appeal a sentence that's within the plea agreement unless I incorporated some impermissible factor.

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MR. LASSART: Your Honor, that's why we're different.
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     We don't have --
               THE COURT: Well, you're different --
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              MR. LASSART: That's what I'm concerned about is I
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      have objected to the quideline range proposed by probation as
      it stands today. Because we've said that the quideline range
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 7
      is X and gave the Court our reasons. The Court has now offered
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     us a hearing on that. We decline to have that hearing. I'm
      concerned that if I don't have a hearing, any objection I have
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     with regard to the -- that is above the range that we believe
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      is correct, I'll lose the right of an appellate issue on that.
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               THE COURT: Yes, and that's absolutely correct.
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              MR. LASSART: So, in other words, I'm being backed
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      into a hearing.
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               THE COURT: You're what?
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              MR. LASSART: I'm being backed into a hearing. I have
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     no choice.
               THE COURT: Oh, well, that's up to you.
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              MR. LASSART: Okay.
               THE COURT: That's up to you. It's entirely up to
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            I mean, the choice you have is whether you want a hearing
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22
     or not.
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              MR. LASSART: Or do I want to preserve the objections
     or not.
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               THE COURT: Well, but you can't -- I mean, it's like
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you say I'm going to object, which you do. And so it's my job to say objection sustained, objection overruled.

MR. LASSART: Correct.

THE COURT: And all I'm saying is in order to say those words, say those words, I need to have a resolution on an evidentiary basis for saying whatever words I'm going to say, whether objection sustained, objection overruled.

MR. LASSART: And I appreciate the Court telling me because this gives -- I can discuss this with some meat on the subject when I talk to my client about it.

THE COURT: As far as I'm concerned, the context where we are today is we're heading for an evidentiary hearing, which is why I brought you in. I thought, well, there are all sorts of dynamics that operate in sentencing, not the least of which is that some defendant may want to be sentenced. I'm not going to remand the defendants. I'm going to give them a reasonable period of time to surrender.

So it doesn't have an impact on that if you didn't want to go ahead on Wednesday and have to surrender on Wednesday. No, that's off the table. I'm not going to give them an extended period of time. They're both going to jail. And I will give a reasonable time so the BOP can designate an institution and so forth. Okay. That's off.

So now you look at and say where do I want to be on Wednesday? Probably somewhere other than here.

MR. LASSART: Oh, it will be interesting, I'm sure. 1 MR. CHATTERJEE: I think we understand that we won't 2 be calling witnesses on Wednesday morning. 3 THE COURT: No. Okay. So is that -- by answering --4 does the government have any questions or observations you want 5 to make? 6 7 MS. BADGER: Your Honor, the only thought that comes to mind, Your Honor, it sounds like there's going to be an 8 evidentiary hearing so perhaps we ought to just open up 9 calendars and discuss dates if --10 11 THE COURT: Sure. 12 MR. CHATTERJEE: I don't want to show a predisposition 13 to one side or the other. We need to talk to our client. Wе 14 need to absorb this. 15 (Simultaneous colloquy.) 16 THE COURT: I mean, I think -- I've just sort of said 17 the obvious, what any person would say. Maybe not. Anyway I've given you some impressions of where I think dates are. 18 And go talk to your clients and see what you want to do. 19 20 Nothing is going to be held against them. Having a hearing, not having a hearing. It's their right. 21 I mean, you sort of have -- I'm thinking you sort of have 22 23 to think about what we're -- I don't know what you think about. I'm not a defense lawyer. Okay. 24 25 MS. BADGER: So perhaps we could be notified by

3:00 o'clock tomorrow? Is that reasonable to notify the Court and the government?

THE COURT: The reason I think it is of some significance is that -- and why it ought to be done tomorrow is that there may be people who would be coming in for the sentencing of your clients that, whoever they are --

MR. CHATTERJEE: I think that's reasonable. By 3:00 o'clock we'll confer with the government and let the Court know.

THE COURT: Is that okay, Mr. Lassart?

MR. LASSART: Somewhere between 3:00 and 4:00 because I have something going, Your Honor.

MR. FRENTZEN: Your Honor, the only reason why I'm hesitating is I know that -- you know, I'm putting something together now for the Court in anticipation of Wednesday. And if we move forward and I know that Mr. Lassart filed something that was in response to our memorandum just today, and I haven't even had an opportunity to look at it. So if there's something in there that we need to address, I mean, if we don't know, I guess we're just not going to know and we're going to end up filing something perhaps unnecessarily. And that's my only issue.

THE COURT: Well, I think that you prepare whatever response you want to Mr. Lassart's memorandum.

MR. FRENTZEN: My point was we don't want to respond

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to anything if we don't have to. But, you know --
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               THE COURT: Well, eventually, I mean, won't I have to
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      deal with those issues anyway?
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              MR. FRENTZEN: But if we're dealing with it through a
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      hearing, then it's a whole 'nother animal and we can just deal
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      with it then. But, you know, we'll take a look and if we feel
      like we need to hustle something up for the Court, we'll do it.
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      It's just -- it may be an unnecessarily jammed up more
      paperwork, but, you know, we do a lot of unnecessary paperwork.
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      So...
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               THE COURT: I don't actually have an answer. There's
     no reason why I can't go on Randy Jackson and Marlon Sullivan.
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              MR. HASIB: I don't think there's any disputes.
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               THE COURT: I look at those, and there's one dispute
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      as to a criminal history point or something. But other than
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      that, I don't think it makes any difference.
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              MR. HASIB: Those should be ready for Wednesday.
               THE COURT:
                          Yeah. So I'm going to sentence those two
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      individuals in any event.
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              MS. BADGER: Okay.
               THE COURT: Well, thank you very much.
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                    (Proceedings adjourned at 2:51 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, KELLY SHAINLINE, Court Reporter for the United
States District Court, Northern District of California, hereby
certify that the foregoing proceedings in CR 14-0196 CRB,
United States of America v. Leland Yee and Keith Jackson, were
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Kelly Shainline

Wednesday, March 9, 2016